Adversaries constantly seek new methods to breach endpoint security, making it essential to minimize potential points of attack, vigilantly monitor events, and regularly test defenses to confirm their effectiveness. This proactive approach ensures preparedness against evolving cyber threats.
Enter Microsoft Defender Attack Surface Reduction (ASR), a frontline defense tool in the cybersecurity arsenal. Defender ASR plays an important role in reducing the attack surface of Windows systems, making it harder for adversaries to evade controls. ASR provides proactive protection against a variety of attack vectors, including malicious scripts, ransomware, and untrusted processes. By implementing rules that restrict potentially harmful behaviors and actions on devices, Defender ASR significantly enhances an organization's security posture. Its integration into the broader Microsoft Defender suite ensures a holistic and layered defense strategy, crucial for combating cyber threats. In essence, Microsoft Defender ASR isn't just a tool; it's a component to reduce the attack surface enough that defenders gain an advantage.
In this blog, the Splunk Threat Research Team will delve into the details of Microsoft Defender ASR's role in reducing the attack surface. Our analysis includes:
Defender ASR is designed to identify and block potentially malicious activities even before they can occur, thereby proactively preventing the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. Some of its key features include:
Using the PowerShell command
(Get-WinEvent -ListProvider "Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender").Events | Format-Table Id, Description
helps administrators extract detailed logs of these events, enabling them to pinpoint specific security incidents and understand the context behind alerts.
Microsoft Defender ASR employs three critical strategies – Block (enabled), Warn, and Audit – each serving a unique purpose.
Microsoft Defender ASR goes beyond being just a tool; it's a strategic asset crucial for controlling and minimizing vulnerability in digital environments. Its capabilities in detecting, preventing, and shedding light on security threats render it an essential element in any strong security setup.
Integrating Microsoft Defender's Operational logs into Splunk can be achieved with a simple modification to your existing or new inputs.conf:
[WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational]
disabled = 0
renderXml = True
sourcetype = XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational
index = win
In our tests, we've found that both multi-line and XML formats work effectively with the provided analytics, but adjustments may be necessary. The Operational logs offer extensive insight into Defender's activities. Therefore, while collecting all data can be beneficial for comprehensive visibility, you may prefer to focus specifically on ASR-related events.
To narrow down the data collection to ASR-specific behaviors, you can refine the inputs.conf as follows:
[WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational]
disabled = 0
renderXml = 0
sourcetype = XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational
index = win
whitelist = 1121|1122|1125|1126|1129|1131|1132|1133|1134|5007
This configuration restricts the data collection to only the ASR event codes (1121, 1122, 1125, and so forth), enabling a more targeted approach in monitoring and analysis within Splunk.
Now that we are collecting the events, how do we know this is actually working? Let’s now enable ASR and perform some Atomic Testing.
Depending on your organization and strategy, placing into Audit mode may be the most effective way to generate events, monitor, tune and add exclusions. This will be a cyclical process until the environment is at a place where block (or enabled) is the default. Also, depending on your organization, you may have the opportunity to use InTune or Windows Group Policy to deploy ASR. More information may be found on the official ASR docs page here. In this blog, we will focus on the PowerShell implementation of ASR and highlight its usage.
Following, here is a simple table showcasing each ID with their respective name:
ID | ASR_Rule |
56A863A9-875E-4185-98A7-B882C64B5CE5 | Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers |
7674BA52-37EB-4A4F-A9A1-F0F9A1619A2C | Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes |
D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A | Block all Office applications from creating child processes |
9E6C4E1F-7D60-472F-BA1A-A39EF669E4B2 | Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe) |
BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550 | Block executable content from email client and webmail |
01443614-CD74-433A-B99E-2ECDC07BFC25 | Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age,or trusted list criterion |
5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC | Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts |
D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D | Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content |
3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899 | Block Office applications from creating executable content |
75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84 | Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes |
26190899-1602-49E8-8B27-EB1D0A1CE869 | Block Office communication application from creating child processes |
E6DB77E5-3DF2-4CF1-B95A-636979351E5B | Block persistence through WMI event subscription |
D1E49AAC-8F56-4280-B9BA-993A6D77406C | Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands |
B2B3F03D-6A65-4F7B-A9C7-1C7EF74A9BA4 | Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB |
92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B | Block Win32 API calls from Office macros |
C1DB55AB-C21A-4637-BB3F-A12568109D35 | Use advanced protection against ransomware |
A8F5898E-1DC8-49A9-9878-85004B8A61E6 | Block Webshell creation for Servers |
In PowerShell, we can enable and manage ASR with the following cmdlets - Set-MpPreference and Get-MpPreference. Let’s check out how to use the cmdlets next.
Now, if you are interested in just enabling everything in a specific mode, it’s possible with the following command, however, note that this expects you have 1 or all enabled already.
Enabled | (Get-MpPreference).AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids | Foreach {Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $_ -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled} |
Audit | (Get-MpPreference).AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids | Foreach {Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $_ -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Audit} |
Warn | (Get-MpPreference).AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids | Foreach {Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $_ -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Warn} |
If you would like to enable all of them for the first time, the following command includes each ASR ID and will set them to mode as expected:
Enable
$asrRuleIds = @{
"56A863A9-875E-4185-98A7-B882C64B5CE5" = "Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers";
"7674BA52-37EB-4A4F-A9A1-F0F9A1619A2C" = "Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes";
"D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A" = "Block all Office applications from creating child processes";
"9E6C4E1F-7D60-472F-BA1A-A39EF669E4B2" = "Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)";
"BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550" = "Block executable content from email client and webmail";
"01443614-CD74-433A-B99E-2ECDC07BFC25" = "Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion";
"5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC" = "Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts";
"D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D" = "Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content";
"3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899" = "Block Office applications from creating executable content";
"75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84" = "Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes";
"26190899-1602-49E8-8B27-EB1D0A1CE869" = "Block Office communication application from creating child processes";
"E6DB77E5-3DF2-4CF1-B95A-636979351E5B" = "Block persistence through WMI event subscription";
"D1E49AAC-8F56-4280-B9BA-993A6D77406C" = "Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands";
"B2B3F03D-6A65-4F7B-A9C7-1C7EF74A9BA4" = "Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB";
"92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B" = "Block Win32 API calls from Office macros";
"C1DB55AB-C21A-4637-BB3F-A12568109D35" = "Use advanced protection against ransomware";
"A8F5898E-1DC8-49A9-9878-85004B8A61E6" = "Block Webshell creation for Servers";
}
foreach ($id in $asrRuleIds.Keys) {
Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $id -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Enabled
}
Write-Host "All specified ASR rules have been set to Enabled."
AuditMode
$asrRuleIds = @{
"56A863A9-875E-4185-98A7-B882C64B5CE5" = "Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers";
"7674BA52-37EB-4A4F-A9A1-F0F9A1619A2C" = "Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes";
"D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A" = "Block all Office applications from creating child processes";
"9E6C4E1F-7D60-472F-BA1A-A39EF669E4B2" = "Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)";
"BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550" = "Block executable content from email client and webmail";
"01443614-CD74-433A-B99E-2ECDC07BFC25" = "Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion";
"5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC" = "Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts";
"D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D" = "Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content";
"3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899" = "Block Office applications from creating executable content";
"75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84" = "Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes";
"26190899-1602-49E8-8B27-EB1D0A1CE869" = "Block Office communication application from creating child processes";
"E6DB77E5-3DF2-4CF1-B95A-636979351E5B" = "Block persistence through WMI event subscription";
"D1E49AAC-8F56-4280-B9BA-993A6D77406C" = "Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands";
"B2B3F03D-6A65-4F7B-A9C7-1C7EF74A9BA4" = "Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB";
"92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B" = "Block Win32 API calls from Office macros";
"C1DB55AB-C21A-4637-BB3F-A12568109D35" = "Use advanced protection against ransomware";
"A8F5898E-1DC8-49A9-9878-85004B8A61E6" = "Block Webshell creation for Servers";
}
foreach ($id in $asrRuleIds.Keys) {
Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $id -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions AuditMode
}
Write-Host "All specified ASR rules have been set to AuditMode."
Warn
$asrRuleIds = @{
"56A863A9-875E-4185-98A7-B882C64B5CE5" = "Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers";
"7674BA52-37EB-4A4F-A9A1-F0F9A1619A2C" = "Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes";
"D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A" = "Block all Office applications from creating child processes";
"9E6C4E1F-7D60-472F-BA1A-A39EF669E4B2" = "Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)";
"BE9BA2D9-53EA-4CDC-84E5-9B1EEEE46550" = "Block executable content from email client and webmail";
"01443614-CD74-433A-B99E-2ECDC07BFC25" = "Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion";
"5BEB7EFE-FD9A-4556-801D-275E5FFC04CC" = "Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts";
"D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D" = "Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content";
"3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899" = "Block Office applications from creating executable content";
"75668C1F-73B5-4CF0-BB93-3ECF5CB7CC84" = "Block Office applications from injecting code into other processes";
"26190899-1602-49E8-8B27-EB1D0A1CE869" = "Block Office communication application from creating child processes";
"E6DB77E5-3DF2-4CF1-B95A-636979351E5B" = "Block persistence through WMI event subscription";
"D1E49AAC-8F56-4280-B9BA-993A6D77406C" = "Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands";
"B2B3F03D-6A65-4F7B-A9C7-1C7EF74A9BA4" = "Block untrusted and unsigned processes that run from USB";
"92E97FA1-2EDF-4476-BDD6-9DD0B4DDDC7B" = "Block Win32 API calls from Office macros";
"C1DB55AB-C21A-4637-BB3F-A12568109D35" = "Use advanced protection against ransomware";
"A8F5898E-1DC8-49A9-9878-85004B8A61E6" = "Block Webshell creation for Servers";
}
foreach ($id in $asrRuleIds.Keys) {
Add-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids $id -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions Warn
}
Write-Host "All specified ASR rules have been set to Warn."
With ASR, we can also specify one or many to enable at once. Here are some example:
Enable: 2. Block Adobe Reader from creating child processes 3. Block abuse of exploited vulnerable signed drivers | Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids 56A863A9-875E-4185-98A7-B882C64B5CE5,7674BA52-37EB-4A4F-A9A1-F0F9A1619A2C,D3E037E1-3EB8-44C8-A917-57927947596D -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions AuditMode |
Now for these rules we can enable exclusions globally or per rule. This is how to perform those actions:
Per-Rule Exclusion | Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids 56A863A9-875E-4185-98A7-B882C64B5CE5 -AttackSurfaceReductionOnlyExclusions -Exclusions c:\temp*.sys |
Global Exclusion | Set-MpPreference -AttackSurfaceReductionOnlyExclusions -Exclusions c:\temp\.sys |
To verify the rules are enabled accordingly, we can run the following:
$asrSettings = Get-MpPreference | Select-Object AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids, AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions for ($i=0; $i -lt $asrSettings.AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids.Count; $i++) { Write-Host ("Rule ID: " + $asrSettings.AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids[$i] + " - Action: " + $asrSettings.AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions[$i]) } |
Once a exclusion is created, verification may be performed with the following:
Get-MpPreference | Select-Object AttackSurfaceReductionOnlyExclusions
Now that we have gone through enabling ASR in one of 3 modes and providing any exclusions, we’ll now jump into Atomic testing.
Now that ASR Rules, one or many are in a state - block, audit, warn, how do we know these actually work? Let’s test 3 ASR rules and review the data in Splunk.
Block all Office applications from creating child processes (D4F940AB-401B-4EFC-AADC-AD5F3C50688A)
Our first Atomic test will utilize a basic Windows Word macro that is meant to generate the telemetry trace we need to ensure ASR in the mode we selected is operational.
Macro:
Sub wshell_exec()
Set wsh = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
wsh.Run "powershell.exe", 1
End Sub
Place this into a new macro in Microsoft Word and run it.
In this test instance this rule is set to block, and the result when the macro is executed it is immediately blocked.
Block Office applications from creating executable content (3B576869-A4EC-4529-8536-B80A7769E899)
In this Atomic test, will will utilize the following macro to write a vbs file to disk and attempt to run it.
Sub Auto_Open()
Dim fso As Object
Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
Dim oFile As Object
Dim TmpFolder As Object
Set TmpFolder = fso.GetSpecialFolder(2)
Set oFile = fso.CreateTextFile(TmpFolder & "\script.vbs")
oFile.WriteLine "Set wsh = CreateObject('wscript.shell')"
oFile.WriteLine "wsh.Run 'calc.exe', 1"
oFile.Close
End Sub
In this test, ASR is set to Warn, therefore it is up to the reviewer to “Unblock” ASR to allow the activity to continue or Block it.
Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands (D1E49AAC-8F56-4280-B9BA-993D77406C)
In our final test, we will download and run PSexec to connect to the local system to spawn a new process. This behavior should be blocked.
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "https://live.sysinternals.com/PsExec64.exe" -OutFile "PsExec64.exe"; .\PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\localhot cmd
For this test, it was enabled in Audit and later Block mode.
For Splunk Security Content, a new analytic story and security content was generated to assist defenders. The content is a mix of anomaly, hunting and TTP. Ensure during your deployment of ASR, modify and tune the analytics as needed for your organization.
This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR audit events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR audit events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that would be blocked by an ASR rule, but is allowed to proceed for auditingpurposes.
`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1122, 1125, 1126, 1132, 1134)
| lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule
| fillnull value=NULL
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Process_Name, Target_Commandline, Path, ID, EventCode, ASR_Rule
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR block events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR block events that are generated when a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule. Typically, these will be enabled in block most after auditing and tuning the ASR rules themselves. Set to TTP once tuned.
`ms_defender` EventCode IN (1121, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1133)
lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule
fillnull value=NULL
stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, Path, Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, ID, EventCode, ASR_Rule
`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
This detection searches for Windows Defender ASR registry modification events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR registry modification events that are generated when a process or application attempts to modify a registry key that is blocked by an ASR rule. Typically, these will be enabled in block most after auditing and tuning the ASR rules themselves. Set to TTP once tuned.
`ms_defender` EventCode IN (5007)
rex field=New_Value "0x(?\d+)$"
rex field=Old_Value "0x(?\d+)$"
rex field=New_Value "Rules\\\\(?[A-Fa-f0-9\\-]+)\\s*="
lookup asr_rules ID AS ASR_ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule
eval New_Registry_Value=case(New_Registry_Value=="0", "Disabled", New_Registry_Value=="1", "Block", New_Registry_Value=="2", "Audit", New_Registry_Value=="6", "Warn")
eval Old_Registry_Value=case(Old_Registry_Value=="0", "Disabled", Old_Registry_Value=="1", "Block", Old_Registry_Value=="2", "Audit", Old_Registry_Value=="6", "Warn")
stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, New_Value, Old_Value, Old_Registry_Value, New_Registry_Value, ASR_Rule
`security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
The following analytic identifies when a Windows Defender ASR rule disabled events. ASR is a feature of Windows Defender Exploit Guard that prevents actions and apps that are typically used by exploit-seeking malware to infect machines. ASR rules are applied to processes and applications. When a process or application attempts to perform an action that is blocked by an ASR rule, an event is generated. This detection searches for ASR rule disabled events that are generated when an ASR rule is disabled.
`ms_defender` EventCode IN (5007)
rex field=New_Value "0x(?\d+)$"
rex field=Old_Value "0x(?\d+)$"
rex field=New_Value "Rules\\\\(?[A-Fa-f0-9\\-]+)\\s*="
lookup asr_rules ID AS ASR_ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule
eval New_Registry_Value=case(New_Registry_Value=="0", "Disabled", New_Registry_Value=="1", "Block", New_Registry_Value=="2", "Audit", New_Registry_Value=="6", "Warn")
eval Old_Registry_Value=case(Old_Registry_Value=="0", "Disabled", Old_Registry_Value=="1", "Block", Old_Registry_Value=="2", "Audit", Old_Registry_Value=="6", "Warn")
search New_Registry_Value="Disabled"
stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host, New_Value, Old_Value, Old_Registry_Value, New_Registry_Value, ASR_Rule
`security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
This hunting analytic targets a range of security events from Microsoft Defender, focusing on the Exploit Guard and Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) features. It monitors specific Event IDs - Event IDs 1121 and 1126 indicate active blocking of unauthorized operations or dangerous network connections, whereas Event IDs 1122 and 1125 represent audit logs for similar activities. Event ID 1129 shows user overrides on blocked operations. For ASR-related activities, Event IDs 1131 and 1133 signal blocked operations, while 1132 and 1134 are audit logs. Event ID 5007 alerts on configuration changes, possibly indicating security breaches.
`ms_defender`
EventCode IN (1121, 1122, 1125, 1126, 1129, 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 5007)
| lookup asr_rules ID OUTPUT ASR_Rule
| fillnull value=NULL
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by host Parent_Commandline, Process_Name, Path, ID, EventCode, ASR_Rule
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
This blog is a critical resource for cybersecurity defenders, offering an in-depth exploration of Microsoft Defender ASR and its integration with Splunk. It highlights the significance of ASR in shrinking the attack surface, providing step-by-step guidance on deployment, atomic testing methodologies, and advanced monitoring techniques. The insights and practical examples presented are invaluable for understanding and implementing ASR's protective measures. This knowledge is essential for defenders looking to enhance their cybersecurity posture and develop robust defenses against evolving cyber threats, making it a must-read for professionals in the field.
In conclusion, ASR coupled with Splunk offers an unparalleled advantage in the cybersecurity landscape. Our blog has meticulously detailed how deploying, testing, and monitoring ASR rules within Splunk can significantly enhance an organization's security posture. By delving into the practicalities of ASR, from its deployment to the intricacies of its rule configurations, we've provided a comprehensive guide that empowers defenders to effectively mitigate advanced cyber threats. The Atomic Testing scenarios presented illuminate the real-world efficacy of ASR rules, showcasing their vital role in safeguarding against sophisticated attacks. Integrating these insights with Splunk's powerful monitoring capabilities creates a robust, proactive defense mechanism. This fusion not only tightens security measures but also equips cybersecurity professionals with the knowledge and tools to stay ahead in an ever-evolving threat landscape. Embracing these practices is not just a strategic move; it's a step towards fortifying your digital fortresses against the adversaries of tomorrow.
You can find the latest content about security analytic stories on GitHub and in Splunkbase. Splunk Security Essentials also has all these detections now available via push update.
For a full list of security content, check out the release notes on Splunk Docs.
Any feedback or requests? Feel free to put in an issue on Github and we’ll follow up. Alternatively, join us on the Slack channel #security-research. Follow these instructions If you need an invitation to our Splunk user groups on Slack.
We would like to thank Michael Haag for authoring this post and the entire Splunk Threat Research Team for their contributions including Teoderick Contreras, Mauricio Velazco, Lou Stella, Bhavin Patel, Rod Soto, Eric McGinnis, and Patrick Bareiss.
The Splunk platform removes the barriers between data and action, empowering observability, IT and security teams to ensure their organizations are secure, resilient and innovative.
Founded in 2003, Splunk is a global company — with over 7,500 employees, Splunkers have received over 1,020 patents to date and availability in 21 regions around the world — and offers an open, extensible data platform that supports shared data across any environment so that all teams in an organization can get end-to-end visibility, with context, for every interaction and business process. Build a strong data foundation with Splunk.