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The Splunk Threat Research team has researched two of the current payloads involved in these heinous campaigns against healthcare and first responder organizations such as Conti & REvil. In the first blog, we explored the REvil ransomware group and in this blog, we will explore Conti.
The Conti ransomware payload is said to have surfaced in the year 2020 and is associated with some of the following attack vectors:
In this blog, I’ll show you how I used Splunk Attack Range, an open-source tool used to simulate cyber attacks. The following screen captures show how Conti ransomware was executed via Splunk Attack Range.
First, we see the ransomware note, presenting a Darkweb address that victims need to visit in order to receive further instructions.
In the following graphic, the victim is asked to upload readme.txt created by the Conti ransomware payload.
Once we upload the readme.txt to the Conti recovery service site hosted at the Darkweb we are presented with a chat window where we can see actual victims being threatened and trying to negotiate ransom payments in a chat platform titled “CONTI Recovery service”. Criminals have also observed posting files they allegedly obtained from victim systems
Further research on this group’s pages at the dark web reveals a “news” site where they publish information obtained from victims.
Ransomware Conti is also known for obfuscating and encrypting its code. The screenshot below shows the different encrypted command line parameters that will be decrypted to check which file encryption feature it needs to execute in a compromised host. If no parameter is found the default is to encrypt all local drives and network share.
CommandLine Arguments |
Description |
-p [folder path] |
Encrypt file in the specified folder path |
-m local |
Encrypt all local drives |
-m net |
Encrypt all network share |
-m all |
Encrypt all local and network drives/share |
-log [log file name] |
Generate a log file of its encryption |
-nomutex |
No Conti mutex created in the machine |
-size |
Encrypt files by chunk size |
Log File: Below is the screenshot of a Conti log file generated as you use the -log feature.
In the Conti sample we have analyzed, we found that it uses the “.LSNWX” file extension for all files it will encrypt in either/both local drive and network share. Below are screenshots of its code creating .LSNWX files, as well as some files getting encrypted.
Below is the screenshot of a log file generated with -m full parameter.
Conti code as it generates the ransomware notes on the affected directory, root drive or network share.
As soon as Conti ransomware finds some files during the encryption process, it will check its file extensions or file name if it is one of the file extensions it wants to avoid encrypting. Below is the list of file extensions and file names we found skips in this malware sample.
.exe, .dll, .sys, .msi, readme.txt, .lnk, .LSNWX, .bat, CONTI_LOG.TXT |
Targeted File Extensions: We also found several file extensions decrypted by this ransomware in memory for small and big files that it wants to encrypt. Below is the screenshot of memory as well as the complete list of the file extensions.
".4dd", ".4dl", ".accdb", ".accdc", ".accde", ".accdr", ".accdt", ".accft", ".adb", ".ade", ".adf", ".adp", ".arc", ".ora", ".alf", ".ask", ".btr", ".bdf", ".cat", ".cdb", ".ckp", ".cma", ".cpd", ".dacpac", ".dad", ".daschema", ".db", ".db-shm", ".db-wal", ".db3", ".dbc", ".dbf", ".dbs", ".dbt", ".dbv", ".dbx", ".dcb", ".dct", ".dcx", ".ddl", ".dlis", ".dp1", ".dqy", ".dsk", ".dsn", ".dtsx", ".dxl", ".eco", ".ecx", ".edb", ".epim", ".exb", ".fcd", ".fdb", ".fic", ".fmp", ".fmp12", ".fmpsl", ".fol", ".fp3", ".fp4", ".fp5", ".fp7", ".fpt", ".frm", ".gdb", ".grdb", ".gwi", ".hdb", ".his", ".ib", ".idb", ".ihx", ".itdb", ".itw", ".jet", ".jtx", ".kdb", ".kexi", ".kexic", ".kexis", ".lgc", ".lwx", ".maf", ".maq", ".mar", ".mas", ".mav", ".mdb", ".mdf", ".mpd", ".mrg", ".mud", ".mwb", ".myd", ".ndf", ".nnt", ".nrmlib", ".ns2", ".ns3", ".ns4", ".nsf", ".nv", ".nv2", ".nwdb", ".nyf", ".odb", ".oqy", ".orx", ".owc", ".p96", ".p97", ".pan", ".pdb", ".pdm", ".pnz", ".qry", ".qvd", ".rbf", ".rctd", ".rod", ".rodx", ".rpd", ".rsd", ".sas7bdat", ".sbf", ".scx", ".sdb", ".sdc", ".sdf", ".sis", ".spq", ".sql", ".sqlite", ".sqlite3", ".sqlitedb", ".te", ".temx", ".tmd", ".tps", ".trc", ".trm", ".udb", ".udl", ".usr", ".v12", ".vis", ".vpd", ".vvv", ".wdb", ".wmdb", ".wrk", ".xdb", ".xld", ".xmlff", ".abcddb", ".abs", ".abx", ".accdw", ".adn", ".db2", ".fm5", ".hjt", ".icg", ".icr", ".kdb", ".lut", ".maw", ".mdn", ".vdi", ".vhd", ".vmdk", ".pvm", ".vmem", ".vmsn", ".vmsd", ".nvram", ".vmx", ".raw", ".qcow2", ".subvol", ".bin", ".vsv", ".avhd", ".vmrs", ".vhdx", ".avdx", ".vmcx" |
Conti Common Exec parameter (New)
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
where Processes.process = "*-m local*" OR Processes.process = "*-m net*" OR Processes.process = "*-m all*" OR Processes.process = "*-nomutex*"
by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid
Detection |
Techniques ID |
Tactic(s) |
Description |
Ransomware Notes bulk creation (Existing) |
Impact |
Detects suspicious bulk creation of ransomware notes (.txt, hta, html) in compromised machine |
|
High Process Termination Frequency (Existing) |
Impact |
Detects a suspicious big number of terminated processes within a time frame. |
|
Suspicious Process File Path (Existing) |
Persistence, Privilege Escalation |
Detects process with suspicious file path |
|
Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring (Existing) |
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
Detects the disablement of Windows Defender monitoring |
|
Windows DisableAntiSpyware Registry (Existing) |
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
Detects the disablement of Defender via the registry |
|
Attempt To Stop Security Service (Existing) |
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools |
Detects an attempt to stop a security service. |
|
Account Discovery With Net App (Existing) |
Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Detects account discovery using net.exe |
|
NLTest Domain Trust Discovery (Existing) |
Domain Trust Discovery |
Detects the usage of nltest.exe performing domain discovery. |
|
DSQuery Domain Discovery (Existing) |
Domain Trust Discovery |
Detects usage of DSQuery performing domain discovery |
|
Create Service In Suspicious File Path (Existing) |
System Services: Service Execution |
Detects services with suspicious file path |
|
Suspicious Rundll32 Activity (Existing) |
Signed Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 |
Identifies suspicious Rundll32.exe usage |
|
Create local admin accounts using net exe (Existing) |
Create Account: Local Account |
Identifies the creation of a local account with net.exe |
|
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Identification of suspicious LSASS access |
||
Detect PsExec With accepteula Flag (Existing) |
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Detect PsExec with AcceptEula flag usage. |
|
Processes launching netsh (Existing) |
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
Detect processes spawning netsh.exe |
SHA256: 59A9F0DE96EFF57768E995B296AE75778A232F30D95A7B7AB5048C621B50C66D
You can also simulate the attack with Splunk Attack Range and use our pre-built tested detections to monitor the environment.
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